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CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO
WATER MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA
by
Norman Uphoff
From a social science perspective much past discussion of "law in
development" has been at an unproductive level of abstraction. Fortu-
nately, the concerns of many within the field are now turning to specific
subjects where concreteness offers opportunity for interaction and mutual
learning between lawyers and social scientists. One such area is "water
management." This paper explores different approaches to the establish-
ment and use of farmer organizations to manage irrigation facilities and
distribute water. The purpose is to contrast the approaches and assess
how "law in development" relates to each.
Water management is a crucial factor in many countries, dependent
as they are on increased agricultural production. While the global race
between population and food expansion at first glance appears to hinge on
increased land and improved technology, requiring ever-increasing
capital investment, water supply is a more critical constraint than land
or capital in many countries.
It is estimated that $50 to 100 billion or more will need to be invested
in irrigation systems by the end of the century to alleviate this constraint.
But unless the water generated by such investment is efficiently utilized--
ultimately and literally at the "grass roots" -- the investment will not pay
off, and many countries may face mounting food shortages.
Irrigation is a comprehensive process requiring, first, the design
and construction (or reconstruction) of physical facilities which capture
and convey water--dams or reservoirs, gates, main canals, distributary
channels, various control structures, and field channels. Beyond this
there are the decision making and associated activities to achieve opera-
tion and maintenance of the system--allocating water and assuring its
flow to desired locations in the intended amounts at specific times. In
addition, and often neglected, drainage facilities must be maintained and
excess water must be removed where it is no longer needed.
"Water management" basically refers to all those aspects of
irrigation beyond the design and construction of facilities. These activi-
ties range from the level of the main system down to the farm level, with
the middle reaches presenting the most difficult challenges of coordination
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among engineers and other technical staff and farmers, who are the ulti-
mate managers of irrigation water. There needs to be some integration
of physical, biological, social organizational, administrative, economic
and legal factors to achieve objectives of agricultural production, but with
concomitant benefits for the participants in the system.
Speaking analytically, we can distinguish three levels of water
management. The first may be called water delivery, where water is to
be released from the headworks (or diverted from a river) and carried
through main channels and branch channels to the distributary CD-channel
gates, in specified amounts according to an agreed schedule. This
amounts to "wholesaling" irrigation water. The "retailing" tasks of water
distribution involve moving water along the D-channel, allocating it among
the field channels, and distributing water along field channels so that each
field gets its appropriate share in a timely way. The last stage is on-farm
water management, which requires farmers to have fields properlyTeveled
and prepared to utilize the water efficiently once it arrives. This repre-
sents the "consumption" of irrigation water.
Most "water management" (WM) research has focused on activities at the
farm level, and indeed sometimes these have been viewed as encompassing
WM. In fact, too little attention has been paid to "managing the main sys -
tem," as Chambers and Wade persuasively argue, 3 and hardly more has
been given systematically to the problems associated with what is called
here "water distribution."
There can be a fairly clear division of labor between the first and
third levels. Engineers have bureaucratic, and often legal, responsibility
for water delivery; but if this first level of WM is not handled in a predict-
able and equitable way, other levels will function less effectively. On-farm
WM, on the other hand, is left to farmers, but irrigation staff may try to
enforce certain WM practices, backed up by legal sanctions. 4 The middle
range of activities is the most complicated because it can be handled either
by technical staff or by farmers (if they are organized); or the responsi-
bility can be discharged jointly. This middle WM area is the focus of this
case study.
Efforts to improve water management are complicated by the fact that
in practically all irrigation agencies of government, most of the profes-
sional (as well as personal) rewards go with the design and construction of
systems rather than to their operation and maintenance (O&M). If there
were more prestige and payoff accruing to O&M, engineers would have
more reason to spend more time dealing with deficiencies in main system
management. While these issues are beyond the scope of this report, we
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need to appreciate that there is a range of operative responsibilities and
roles, from the engineers at the top, through the technical staff at inter-
mediate levels, to the farmers, whose receipt and productive use of water
constitutes the objective of the whole irrigation enterprise.
The legal dimensions of WM differ from the law associated with
irrigation. We are not concerned here with water law or riparian rights
as generally dealt with in legal codes. Rather, the primary focus is on
organizational and legal frameworks for getting better use of water--with
how equitable, reliable and adequate is the distribution. Legal rules by
themselves have limited effectiveness. If disputes over interpretation are
adjudicated in formal institutional terms, a delay of even a few days can
have quite detrimental consequences for a crop, and for the farmers in-
volved. Law thus needs to play a facilitative role rather than a sanctioning
one in order to support productive behavior. 5
In the context of rice cultivation, variables include the schedule of
cultivation (from first preparation of land for cultivation to final harvesting
of the crop--if all farmers adhere closely to a common schedule, water
issues can be more appropriate and limited), the crops planted (rice culti-
vation requires more water than other crops, and mixed cropping compli-
cates the requirements for water), the varieties planted (different matur-
ation periods affect the appropriate timing of water issues) and cultivation
practices (fertilizer and pesticide applications should be coordinated with
water applications).
These and other variables mean that hydraulic activity (water
delivery) must be related to plants, soil, climate, and the people who
make the system work or falter. Legal norms which might be feasible if
WM involved only water delivery appear quite inadequate when confronted
with needs to get the best use of water; the scheduling requirements can
vary, for instance, between an area with predictable rainfall and one
where it is erratic. If there are labor shortages in an area, the govern-
ment can hardly require certain timing of operations; imposing fines on
farmers suffering climatic or labor problems is no solution.
Water distribution is only one of the essential WM functions to be
performed at different levels. There is also need for maintenance of the
physical facilities which involves the mobilization of lab-or, equipment,
and often finances (fees, taxes, etc.) to keep the system operating satis-
factorily. Drainage activities may also be important. Further there is
need for conflict management, since even in the best operated systems
there are invariably disputes over water and related matters. If not
satisfactorily resolved, they will interfere with distribution and mainte-
nance of the system.
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These functions are affected by individual (private) decisions, but we
are also dealing with social processes requiring a high degree of coopera-
tive behavior. Accommodation between individual and collective interests
leads toward an optimum solution for the largest number of water users.
Private maximizing behavior undermines the functions of WM.
What makes water management difficult and challenging, intellectually
and theoretically, is that certain participants (head-enders) are inescap-
ably "more equal" than others (tail-enders). In WM, one contends not
only with conflicts between individual and collective interest, in which
motivations, sanctions, ideology, etc., are all complex. One also deals
with locational factors which, however predictable, make it difficult to
match up private and public good. Fortunately, head -enders and tail -
enders along a field channel or even distributary, who may have conflict-
ing interests in distributing a given volume of water among themselves,
usually have a common interest in getting a larger volume from within the
larger system. So locational factors do produce some countervailing in-
centives for solidarity despite the ever-present ones for division.
WM offers an instance where equity and efficiency go together rather
than confront each other with antagonistic goals. 7 When water is more
broadly and evenly distributed, total production is usually increased. Of
course there can be exceptions when the amount to be distributed is so
limited that most of the crop would die if equally watered, or if irregu-
larity of water issues means that some crops served by a rotational
schedule would not survive the gaps in delivery. As a rule, total produc-
tion (not necessarily each individual's production) will go up when water is
shared more evenly, 8 particularly if land holdings are relatively equal.
I. BACKGROUND ON WATER MANAGEMENT IN SRI LANKA
The importance of water management (WM) in Sri Lanka is gaining
acceptance. Ten years ago the subject was hardly distinguished from irri-
gation. Yet water appears to be the most significant constraint to increas-
ing food production; maximizing returns to water is more important for
national output than maximizing returns to land or labor. 9 The Sri Lankan
government has embarked on a massive irrigation project, the Mahaweli
scheme, to irrigate 600,000 acres and rehabilitate 300,000 more. Origi-
nally planned to take 30 years, the project has been accelerated to less
than ten years (if financing and construction capacity permit) but scaled
down somewhat in area. The estimated cost of the Mahaweli scheme is
approaching $2 billion, and still rising.
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Since investments in large-scale irrigation are very expensive, 10
improvements in WM offer a cost-effective avenue to raising production.
Indeed, WM is a particularly urgent matter where large irrigation
schemes with modern technology have been at high cost and where the
difficulties of operating the main system, so as to link water deliveries
with farmers' needs are greater.
It is not just a matter of numbers, though there can be a hundred or
even a thousand times more farmers and acres depending on a large
scheme than those who depend upon a village-operated tank. In small
schemes, farmers are better able to operate the system themselves.
Water waste is visible, and it often hurts neighbors, even kinsmen. By
contrast, farmers in a large scheme have little knowledge about how much
water is available and how much area is to be served. Any water hoarded
is "wasted" at the expense of "strangers. " Because more is at stake with
large schemes, and because WM is more difficult to institute and sustain,
our discussion will focus on them. We need to consider briefly the agency
which is responsible for constructing and operating such schemes, the Irri-
gation Department, because its orientation and capacity affect crucially
the viability of any attempted approach to water management.
The Irrigation Department
Water management problems have commonly been viewed as caused
by farmers. But we increasingly see that farmers' behavior is most
directly shaped by the reliability and adequacy of water issues from the
main system and by their relations with the "bureaucracy" that regulates
water supply. 11 In Sri Lanka, the Irrigation Department (ID) is thus the
key actor, the Prince in our water management "Hamlet."
The Department has a long and honorable tradition, seeing itself as
the inheritor of a monumental irrigation legacy of ancient Sinhalese times.
Founded in 1900, it has undertaken to rehabilitate tanks left in ruin for
centuries, and it has launched many new schemes in the Dry Zone of Sri
Lanka. 12 It has sought to maintain its professional competence and inde-
pendence by keeping politics at arm's length. It is staffed by technical
personnel, with civil engineers, rather than agricultural engineers, pro-
viding leadership and setting the terms of reference. Not surprisingly,
design and construction are given more recognition and reward than oper-
ation and maintenance; and maintenance often assumes more importance
than operation of the system.
There has been some decentralization with each administrative sub-
division (range) headed by a Deputy Director of the Department. He is
-208-
part of the cadre of senior engineers who share experience, attitudes and
interests and who are inclined to operate the ID in a relatively collegial
manner. This, plus the formal decentralization just mentioned, helps to
mitigate the common problem of a gap between central headquarters and
the field operations, which is no less common in Sri Lanka than else-
where. The manner of decision making and implementation has for
decades been essentially "top-down," and field staff alternately look for
direction from above and chafe at its imposition. Staffing technical posi-
tions has become more difficult as the private sector, the Mahaweli
project and the lure of lucrative positions abroad have reduced the ID's
ranks of engineers. 13 The current budget squeeze puts the Department
under further stress. It does not have the necessary personnel or
budget resources to meet all expectations. Efforts to "decentralize" and
develop collegial decision making have only partially ameliorated the
problems.
These kinds of institutional considerations are often ignored in
legalistic approaches to improving WM--approaches which assume that
legal rules can make institutions operate as they are supposed to, and
that they are capable of accomplishing all that is assigned to them. The
attitudes and orientations which officials embody, and which are "outside
the law," will shape the behavior of officials and the public as profoundly
as any legal prescription can. The institutions, processes and officials
through which governments act are seldom neutral in the eyes of the
public, even if the law turns a blind eye towards these structural defi-
ciencies. There is in Sri Lanka the added influence of "history" which is
deep and understandably important. Lawyers and other "experts" often
fail to take adequate account of these influences on behavior.
Historical Perspectives
Ancient Ceylon developed a remarkable civilization between the fifth
century B.C. and the 12th century A.D. based on major tank irrigation
schemes. Although the political system was a monarchy, there is little
to show that it was a "hydraulic civilization" in the terms that Wittfogel
argues, 14 though his thesis may be rescued in the eyes of some by point-
ing to the fact that the system was based on decentralized tanks rather
than a single riverine source. The huge tanks were built with mathemat-
ical and engineering skills of which there is no record apart from the
monumental structures. One main canal linking two tanks was con-
structed with a drop of only six inches per mile for 18 miles, a feat diffi-
cult to match even with modern technology.
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There is some disagreement over how water was managed under
these tanks, though a leading historian, K. M. de Silva, suggests that most
administration was fairly decentralized, with considerable local manage-
ment. 1 5 One of the few written records about water management, an in-
scribed pillar found in the Gal Oya area, described stiff fines and penal-
ties for cultivator infractions, but noted also that these were decided upon
by the cultivators themselves, to be enforced by the king's agents. 1 6 We
know that with the irrigation facilities provided, farmers produced a mate-
rial basis upon which an elegant civilization flourished until it inexplicably
collapsed between the 12th and 13th centuries. 17
During the period of British colonial rule, from 1815 on, local
institutions which regulated water use and organized maintenance--village
councils known as Gam Sabha--were first abolished and then restored be-
cause they were so essential to sustaining food production. 18 The role of
a water headman (vel vidane) was recognized officially and a share of the
crop went to him as payment for his services of overseeing water distri -
bution and system upkeep. 19 The vel vidane's powers to enforce planting
schedules, to resolve disputes, to get protective fencing put up around the
cultivated area, to collect his fee, and so forth, were rooted in the social
structure; he was usually from one of the wealthier and more influential
families, and often himself owned more than the average size holding.
Compliance was thus based on more than voluntary consent, but, the main
sanction was community pressure against those who broke ranks to seek
individual gains at others' expense. Significantly, such social cohesion
and pressure is lacking in the colonization schemes such as Gal Oya where
settlers were moved in from different provinces across Sri Lanka.
In the 1930s, after internal self-rule was granted by the British, the
government began to resettle the DryV one, which covers all but the
southwestern quadrant of the island. This latter area, known as the Wet
Zone, has two monsoon seasons a year, whereas the rest of the island has
only one. The 80 inches of rain that fall on average in the Dry Zone are a
substantial amount, but rainfall is quite concentrated. With 75 percent
falling in a single three-month period, only one crop can be grown in a
year without irrigation, and even that crop benefits from supplemental
water supply.
The largest irrigation-settlement scheme in Sri Lanka, until the
advent of the Mahaweli project, was Gal Oya in the southeast corner of the
country. By building a large dam across the Gal Oya river and creating a
giant reservoir (Senanayake Samudra, named for Sri Lanka's first prime
minister and the moving spirit behind Dry Zone colonization when he was
Minister of Agriculture), an area offering irrigation for over 120,000
acres was created between 1948 and 1952.
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11. THE GAL OYA PROJECTS - OLD AND NEW
There are really two Gal Oya projects being implemented by the
Irrigation Department. The first was an irrigation and settlement project
financed by the Government. The second (undertaken with $9.8 million in
loans and grants from the U.S. Agency for International Development) is a
water management project. Physical rehabilitation of the deteriorated
system is the main financial component, but improvement of management
of the system is central to the outcome.
The original settlement program involved about 6,000 households each
getting a three or four acre irrigated allotment with an acre or so of non-
irrigated "highland" for a house, garden and subsidiary crops. In order to
prevent subdivision and to preserve security of smallholder tenure no
titles were given out, only certificates of occupancy. Fragmentation and
alienation of land proved difficult to prevent by legal means, however.
The rule was that only one descendant could legally inherit a colonists
allotment, but land has in fact often been shared within a household and
even parcelled out informally to multiple heirs. Various leasing arrange-
ments and de facto "sales" of land often circumvent the intent of the legal
restriction. Settlers were assigned to one of the 42 colony units (num-
bered or lettered, not named) on the Left Bank. Holdings in the River
Division remained under their original owners, as did privately-owned
land in the Left or Right Bank areas. Additional colony units were estab-
lished on the Right Bank.
The Left Bank has been the main focus of past settlement efforts (42
colony units) and of recent rehabilitation efforts now, and it is the source
of most social and economic problems affecting WM. Most of the Left
Bank settlers came from Sinhalese communities in other parts of Sri
Lanka, but Tamil and Moslem households already living in the lower
reaches of the Left Bank area, near the coast, were resettled as colonists
in tail-end colony units. 2 1 This socio-economic division was only one of
many problems which the scheme encountered.
Physical, Social and Administrative Problems
To begin, this area, reputedly the "granary of Ceylon" hundreds of
years earlier, was not as suited to irrigated cultivation as had been be-
lieved. No detailed soil studies have ever been made of this terrain, wh
which has considerable variation and is quite uneven. Much of the soil
was too porous to hold water well, and other areas, particularly nearer
the coast had drainage and even salinity problems. Indeed, a 1970 study
commission on the Gal Oya scheme concluded that no further work should
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be done on the scheme without a thorough soil study first. 22 Unfortu -
nately, the designers of the new project showed no knowledge of this ex-
pert report. Yet the soil and drainage problems in the area make water
management itself a more difficult task.
A purpose of the settlement itself was to alleviate population
pressures in the Wet Zone. So when accepting household for settlement,
preference was given to large families. This had the advantage in the
short run of enlarging the household's labor supply. But it meant even
more pressure on limited soil and water resources, as the children ma-
tured and needed farms of their own. This led to encroachment on gov-
ernment land reserved for pasture forests, irrigation system mainte-
nance access and other purposes. 23 The disorder in the system, making
water management problems more serious, can be traced in part to this
initial decision to introduce large families.
The settlements themselves were planned to be relatively homoge-
neous socially, but adjacent units were often inhabited by different ethnic
or caste groups. Getting cooperation between different groups is neces -
sary when a distributary channel, or sometimes even a field channel,
crosses unit boundaries, and little effort was made to match social and
hydrologic units. Even within units there were often problems of cooper-
ation when the newly-'estabihed households did not share the same ties
of kinship which made "old" villages more cohesive entities. 24 The pro-
vision of promised amenities lagged, giving settlers other grounds for
discontent. Persons used to the climate and facilities of the Wet Zone
often found the heat, seasonal drought and general conditions of Gal Oya
oppressive. Still, the human capacity for adaptation seems to have
triumphed as new communities took root.
Other problems are created by the limited water supply. The
reservoir has filled only twice in 30 years, and occasionally, as in 1981,
it has suffered severe shortage due to failure of rains in the catchment
area. Compounding this has been the steady increase in cultivated areas
within the scheme, due mostly to encroachments which are illegal but are
meeting human needs. The "command area" of the Left Bank was planned
as 42,000 acres, but by 1980 it reached between 60,000 and 75,000 acres
(nobody knew exactly how much). With such a disparity between the water
available and the area needing water, there are bound to be shortages,
even severe ones. This was made more serious in human terms because
much of the Left Bank area depends for its domestic water on water issues
through the main canal and distributary system to charge the ground water
enough to operate wells. With such shortages, the predictable problem of
disparity between head-end and tail-end areas becomes more acute. Some
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tail-end units have received no water through the system for years. (In
1980, one unit at the tail, unaccustomed to receiving any water, finally
got a delivery, but only after it had already commenced harvesting its
crop). This disparity is sharpened because of the ethnic differences
between head-end and tail-end colony units. ID engineers insist that the
failure of the tail to get water is not due to ethnic discrimination against
Tamils, since most of the engineers serving in the scheme are them-
selves Tamil.
Problems of head-end and tail-end differences exist at many levels of
the system. Those at the tail of a distributary even high up in the system
can still suffer a lack of water if not enough is delivered into their D-
channel, or if farmers ahead of them along the D-channel use water waste-
fully. Head -tail difficulties are complicated by the way colony units and
administrative boundaries were laid out, without regard to hydrological
areas commanded by a given field channel or distributary. Some D-
channels run through several colonies; and some colony units have mem-
bers farming along several different D-channels, so they have less need
to cooperate than if they shared a common water source. When adminis-
trative and social boundaries do not coincide with hydrological ones, many
difficulties can arise simply from this discrepancy.
These several problems -- soil conditions, population pressure with
resulting subdivision and encroachments, social heterogeneity, insufficient
water, and inconsistent boundaries -- represent constraints affecting water
management which, except for the last one, are not amenable to conven-
tional "legal" solutions. They constitute "givens" which must be taken
into account when trying to assess new approaches for improved water
management.
Emerging Problems in System Operation
Beyond these "givens" there are other adverse dynamics which have
worsened in recent years. The Gal Oya irrigation system, established
with great hopes, has deteriorated physically. In general, water control
has become less feasible and water distribution more inequitable as the
physical system has fallen into disrepair. Lack of maintenance has per-
mitted channels to silt up or become crowded with weeds and lose carry-
ing capacity. Banks have been breached and large amounts of water run
out of the channels into unintended "reservoirs" losing water through
evaporation or seepage. Banks are so eroded that many gates and turn-
outs no longer function as designed -- indeed, some structures stand mutely
in the middle of channels widened by scouring currents over the years.
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There are many reasons for this situation. Locationally, head -
enders have little incentive to dig out channels in their area because they
can get enough water without such effort, and maintenance would only help
water flow past them to farmers downstream. In Gal Oya specifically,
farmers do not own the land they cultivate and have tended to view the irri-
gation system, like the land, as being "the government's," not as "theirs."
This means attributing responsibility for all upkeep to the ID, even if the
ID has not the resources to discharge it. That all communities were arti-
ficially created, with no established social structure, makes organization
for maintenance more difficult. Ironically, with most farmers having
equal-sized holdings, few are in a position to assert leadership and have
it accepted as in "old" villages, where status and wealth reinforced the
authority these other resources conferred on notables. It is also unfor-
tunate that the Buddhist institutions of temple and priest are not so strong
in the settlement area, because priests who are respected and active can
mobilize voluntary labor to clean channels and repair bunds.
If the non-state institutions are weaker in the area, so are the state
ones. The perenially short-staffed under-funded ID in Gal Oya has been
unable to de-silt channels thoroughly or repair all damaged structures.
The breaking of structures, particularly gates to control the flow of
water into D-channels and also turnouts regulating flow into field channels,
is by now particularly serious. As farmers have encountered water short-
ages, they have taken it upon themselves to acquire more water by any
means. This includes not only breaking gates but also those checks built
across channels which raise the water level for others. A farmer may
even put in his own (illegal) checks to divert more water to his own
channel or field. It is estimated that about three-quarters of the control
structures in the Left Bank of the Gal Oya system have been broken. 2 5
Yet, budget and personnel can handle only about one-tenth of the number
damaged. The ID faces a vicious circle effect, where it cannot control
water because structures are broken, and structures are broken because
it cannot control water. 26
The ID can presently monitor and operate only the seven main
regulators within the system, sending water down the main and branch
channels roughly as intended. At lower levels, even when the gates are
working and can be operated by lowest-level ID staff possessing keys, the
farmers have just as effective home-made wooden keys. 2 7 They can use
these to change gate settings as soon as the staff member has bicycled
away. There is enough farmer solidarity that none who benefit will com-
plain or inform against the offender.
-215-
As settlement has increased, interstitial areas which lie between the
colony settlements and have access to drainage water have been en-
croached upon or registered outright by private owners (sometimes with
forged papers known locally as "Japanese deeds"). Field channels may be
extended (illegally) to serve areas outside colony boundaries, or drainage
channels may be operated as field channels by enterprising farmers. Such
re-use might be welcomed since it increases the efficiency of total water
use. But once an area becomes regularly cultivated, it stakes a claim on
water which may compete with that of others previously being served.
This greatly complicates the issue of who should become a member of
water-user associations, and whether such encroachers should have equal
rights with colonists.
Indeed, when large extents of "private lands" are controlled by
influential persons, such as merchants who are not owner -operators, this
results in the anomaly of powerful tail-enders. If they rent out the land
they have acquired to tenants, this creates a further problem for assigning
rights and duties in water management. Should the tenant or the landowner
be the member of a water-user association? Or should both belong? The
expansion of such "private lands," occurring particularly in recent years,
takes on a dynamic of its own, creating new interests that compete with
those of the colonists. Small encroachments in the areas adjacent to
colony holdings may not present much of a problem, but large ones do.
Even when the encroachers are offspring of colonists, when water is in
short supply there is the possibility of conflict.
These various factors taken together have contributed to actual or
potential conflict within Gal Oya communities, between units which com-
pete for water, between farmers entitled to irrigation water and en-
croachers relying on drainage water, between tenants and large land -
owners (neither of whom have legal status), as well as the universal
tensions between head-enders and tail-enders and the particular division
in Gal Oya between ethnic communities at the head and tail. On top of this
there has been antagonism toward the Irrigation Department. Many of the
farmer complaints are about things for which the ID is not responsible, or
over which it has no control. But other matters can justifiably be raised.
The interaction between farmers and technical staff, compounded in some
cases by difficulties in understanding the language or technical terms
used, is quite often unsatisfactory to both sides.
Most of these problems are not unique to the Gal Oya scheme, or even
to the ID. All can be found in various forms in other large-scale schemes,
and "bureaucratic" or "technocratic" relations with the public are widely
deemed unsatisfactory in Sri Lanka. What is different for Gal Oya is the
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intensity and combination with which they occur, making this a scheme
which urgently needs improvement, both in terms of physical rehabilita-
tion and in terms of farmer organization and participation for water
management.
The Current Gal Oya Project
The importance of improved water management, sketched at the
beginning of this paper, has not been lost on the Sri Lankan government or
on foreign donors. In particular, the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (AID) concluded by 1978 that WM represented one of the main com-
ponents of any successful development effort for Sri Lanka and indicated
its willingness to make WM a priority in its aid program for Sri Lanka.
Improving WM was seen as a complicated task, requiring 10-20 years for
substantial progress. Sri Lankan institutional and professional capabili-
ties in this area were very limited, and what little work had been done on
the subject in Sri Lanka had been done mostly by expatriates. Upgrading
the capability of the Irrigation Department to deal with WM problems and
expanding the number of Sri Lankans with sufficient interdisciplinary com-
petence to provide critical analysis and intellectual leadership was seen
as a first step toward long-run impact.
An initial Water Management Project (WMP) was conceived to combine
efforts at physically rehabilitating an existing irrigation system with insti-
tutional development to improve water management, including experimen-
tation with forms of farmer organization. It was agreed that Gal Oya, the
oldest and largest major scheme, badly in need of rehabilitation, be se-
lected for the pilot effort. The four-year project was to be the first stage
of a longer effort by AID and the Government of Sri Lanka to achieve insti-
tutional strengthening in the WM area.
The advisability of beginning with the most difficult scheme is debat-
able. A senior ID official told the author, "if we can solve the problems in
Gal Oya, we can solve water management problems anywhere in Sri Lanka."
The consultant team which undertook to design the project adopted an opti-
mistic "can do" attitude. To be sure, it was limited in the time it had for
the assessment of so complicated a situation and problem. But its mem-
bers spent only one to two weeks in the field out of the two months in-
country. Its willingness to work from official statistics meant it was con-
straned to think within the parameters of prevailing perceptions. The
knotty problem of "private lands" within the schemes, for example, was
not taken into account because these were outside the "target group" colo-
nies. More serious field work could and should have identified this prob-
lem, which di Vctly affects the colonists and their water management
possibilities.
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The project design resulting from the consulting team's work was
almost entirely focused on rehabilitation, with concomitant upgrading of
ID capacity seen only in technical terms. Regarding farmers' role in WM,
it was assumed that they could be required to cooperate with the ID on
planting schedules, maintenance work, etc. The Irrigation Ordinance pro-
vided for penalties, fines and even prison, for breaches of prescribed irri-
gation practices. It seemed a simple thing to the technical consultants to
rely on enforcement of the law, without inquiring why the law was more
widely breached than honored. The Ordinance was a legacy of the colonial
era when government officers felt unconstrained about issuing orders and
enforcing them. Under the British, it was the local revenue officers who
were entrusted with responsibility for overseeing the production calendar
and rules in consultation with farmers. That they had extensive tax
powers surely augmented their effectiveness in irrigation matters, some-
thing apparently not understood by the consultants.
The AID mission in Sri Lanka took the initiative to add a "farmer
organization" component to the project design. Two aspects of this form
the crux of our analysis. AID offered to provide the services of a legal
consultant to draft amendments to the Irrigation Ordinance, to enact a
legal basis for water-user associations operating under the administrative
aegis of the Irrigation Department. At the same time, AID and the Sri
Lankan Government delegated responsibilities for implementing the socio-
economic aspects of the project to the Agrarian Research and Training
Institute (ARTI), which operates under the Ministry of Agriculture but
serves the whole agrarian sector. These aspects included, in addition to
baseline surveys, special studies and monitoring, the formulation, testing
and refinement of models for farmer organization to improve WM in the
project area and, it was expected, eventually the rest of Sri Lanka. The
Rural Development Committee of Cornell University, which had had an
interdisciplinary working group on water management problems, was
asked to provide short-term and long-term consultancy in support of
ARTI's efforts. 2 9
This background prepares us to consider the different approaches
taken as part of the Gal Oya project. It should be stressed that neither
approach would be regarded by its proponents as the "ideal," since many
institutional and resource constraints had to be accepted from the outset.
Both approaches embody "legal" and "organizational" mechanisms, though
the first proposed working from legal enactment to creation of organiza-
tions, while the second sought to introduce and experiment with organiza-
tions prior to specifying legal provisions. The two approaches could be
loosely characterized as more "top-down" and more "bottom-up," but this
does not express the extent to which both sought to induce "bottom-up"
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capacity of farmers to participate in better water management through
different kinds of "top-down" initiative. The best distinction might be in
terms of the more "deductive" method of the first, reasoning from legal
principles and experience elsewhere, and the more "inductive" strategy of
the second, following a "learning process" approach analyzed elsewhere by
Korten. 3 0 Experience in the Philippines and Nepal was considered in for-
mulating the design of this experimental program, particularly the catalyst
role of "institutional-organizers," but it was expected that field experience
would produce different understandings and recommendations than a priori
reasoning, even by consultants with considerable experience elsewhere.
I II. A DEDUCTIVE APPROACH TO WATER MANAGEMENT IN GAL OYA
The potential value of farmer organizations and participation in the
WM enterprise was appreciated in both of the approaches provided for by
the project. The issue was how to introduce and sustain them--with what
degree of formal-legal authorization, with what prior knowledge of the
system and its variation, with what amount of experimentation, and how
much uniformity? The project paper initially conceived of farmer organi-
zations (FOs) as being introduced as an activity separate from but parallel
to the physical rehabilitation of the system. During the four years of the
project, there would be efforts to experiment with and set up FOs, while
the work on dredging channels, reshaping them, repairing gates and other
control structures would be done. At the end of this time, FOs would take
over responsibility for operating and maintaining the system, at least at
the lower levels, in the WM equivalent of a "turnkey" operation. There
was a statement in the project paper that farmers would be expected to
contribute labor to rehabilitate the field channels as part of the recon-
struction effort, while the ID was improving the main and distributary
channels. But this was not spelled out, and farmers had not been con-
sulted on this proposed mode of "participation," so it was not clear what
implications, if any, this had for getting farmer WM groups started.
The legal consultant who came out to Sri Lanka to advise on a new
irrigation ordinance had studied water-user associations elsewhere,
especially in Spain. 3 1 He had previously prepared a legal framework for
such associations in Pakistan, and the same basic scheme was incorpor-
ated into a draft law for Sri Lanka, using a Sinhala designation for the
farmer organization to operate at the distributary channel level, the Jala
Sampath Palaka Sabhawe (JSPS), meaning Council for Administering VM-ed
Water Resources. The proposal called for a multiple-tier structure, with
farmer committees (or representatives) at the field channel level joined
together in the JSPS, which would manage water within a D-channel com-
mand area. In turn, JSPSs would be represented on a Project Committee
at the "apex" level, such as for the Left Bank or for the whole Gal Oya
scheme. 32
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No criticism is made of the concept of a multi-level organization,
which we have found quite sound in other analyses of development experi-
ence. 3 3 Rather, questions may reasonably be raised about the way such
organizations were to be introduced and about the assumptions m-ae con-
cerning the roles and incentives for farmers and ID staff.
(1) A first concern was the emphasis upon the D-channel level as
the most important level of organization, with the JSPS becoming the piv-
otal institution in the scheme of water management. It is argued by some
that the field channel, which serves 5, 10, 15, or 20, even up to 50
farmers is too small for an efficient organization. But this combines the
economists' logic of economies of scale, which may be offset by econo-
mies of de-scale, 3 4 with the lawyer's logic which looks for entities that
have or can have legal standing. It seemed difficult to set up and deal with
a thousand "basic" organizations in legally correct terms, so there was a
preference for having "corporate" bodies organized at a higher level than
suggested by sociological analyses which stressed group identity and soli-
darity as motivational factors. Having larger organizations permits more
resource aggregation and provides a larger pool from which to draw lead -
ership, but it dilutes the strength of attachment to the organization, and
offers greater heterogeneity of background and interest which may inhibit
organizational effectiveness.
An empirical fact is that D-channels vary greatly in the number of
farmers and area served. Along the Uhana Branch channel, one distribu-
tary has as few as 30 farmers cultivating 61 acres, while another has 377
Fa-rmers on 748 acres. 3 5 Some field channels are as large as 82 farmers
cultivating 185 acres and even one sub-field channel area is almost as
large as the smallest D-channel are-. The draft law provided that the
ID's Project Engineer would define boundaries, and could set up more than
one JSPS on a large distributary, or combine several small distributaries
into one JSPS unit (Sec. 12). But this would still leave considerable vari-
ation in the basic units of organization, with variable attachment to them
by members because of the different circumstances of cultivation.
In setting up the JSPS, the Project Engineer would instruct all water
users along each field channel within the D-channel area to elect a Field
Channel Committee (FCC)--or select a Field Channel Representative
(FCR) if there were 15 or fewer farm plots on the channel. One repre-
sentative from each field channel (a FCC would select one member to
serve as its FCR) would come together to form a Representative Assembly
for the JSPS, and to elect an Executive Committee from among its member-
ship. Once constituted, the JSPS would become the pivotal organizational
actor in water management, with farmer membership in the JSPS con-
sidered primary.
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(2) At the field channel level, there were some options suggested. As
just noted, a Field Channel Committee needed to be formed only if there
were more than 15 plots along it; otherwise a single representative could
be chosen. If there were an "existing farmer representative" overseeing
WM activities, such as a Vel Vidane carrying out a traditional water head-
man role, such a person could be designated to perform the same functions
as the FCC or FCR (Sec. 15.2). This was a valuable provision in that it
was flexible, but it was not clear why the number 15 or any other had to be
a universal cut-off point if farmers could be given an option in how they
would be represented and supervised in WM matters. In fact, by January
1982, when farmers in the pilot organizing area of nearly 4,000 acres had
been encouraged to form their own water management organizations in
whatever manner they preferred, none of the 71 field channels had set up
committees. But almost all had chosen representatives for roughly every
15 farmers. (Two-thirds of the groups were between 12 and 18 farmers,
with an upper-size limit of around 25 perceived by farmers, and a lower
one of 7 or 8). So the proposed law was not far off in focusing on the
number 15, but was too elaborate in specifying committees above this and
too rigid in not allowing farmers to vary the structure of representation to
meet local social and hydrological variation. When there were more than
about 25 farmers on a field channel, with only two exceptions, farmers
themselves divided the channel for organizational and management pur-
poses into two groups. Above 40 or 45, they would choose three repre-
sentatives. A committee mechanism at the field channel level, however,
was not supported. Farmers said this was too much like the many formal
organizations they had previous unhappy experience with.
(3) At the other end of the organizational spectrum, the provisions for
an apex organization at the project level were innovative, given the fact
that farmers presently had at most de facto authority at the field channel
level and no recognized voice at all above that. By making all JSPS chair-
men members of the Project Committee, this meant that even with ex-
officio members from the government side, farmers could have a large
majority. Their authority, however, would be ambiguous since resolu-
tions of the Project Committee would have no effect until approved by the
Minister. The contradictions and possible conflicts arising from such
token authority were left unaddressed.
(4) One of the most attractive features of the proposal was that the
Field Channel Committees and JSPS Executive Committee would have
representation weighted in favor of the middle and tail. In a five-member
EC, for exampre, the head, middle and tail would have 1, 2, and 2 repre-
sentatives, respectively (or 2, 3, and 4 in a nine-member committee).
FCCs would thus by law have a majority from the middle and tail (though
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this would not prevent the head and middle from having a majority against
the tail). It was taken for granted that determining cut-off points between
head, middle and tail would be sufficiently obvious to be non-controversial,
probably because of an oversimplified view of what is a "typical" channel.
Also, this recommendation did not allow for the possibility and problem of
having powerful tail -enders as do indeed exist sometimes in Gal Oya.
They need no enhanced representation. The committee structure proposed
to assist "weak" tail-enders would not be universally helpful, and in any
case, would be more cumbersome than farmers want.
(5) Probably the most questionable part of the draft was the formula-
tion of JSPS "powers" (Sec. 9). While these are introduced as if they were
"rights," most really amounted to "responsibilities." Most were new im-
positions, and those which had been previously declared were not being
effectively enforced. Only one stated a clearly positive benefit for
farmers: "Ensure that all members' rights under the law are respected,
and that each member gets his share of water in a timely fashion" (15.13).
Other sub-sections sought to impose obligations such as annual mainte-
nance of field channels and farm ditches, improving water courses, land
leveling and economic practices, collecting general and special fees, pro-
viding labor for emergency repairs, installing and maintaining drainage
facilities for fields, ensuring that all members contribute their share of
labor, money, etc., and preventing "encroachments." (The latter is a
particularly difficult and onerous task since relatives may be involved.)
Since the JSPS was to be mandatory, membership would become compul-
sory, but this could hardly assure the expected effort and cooperation
when more burdens than benefits at least in the short run, were laid upon
farmers by law.
A careful reading reveals that the draft law proposed no responsi-
bilities for the irrigation bureaucracy, on whom farmers depend for water
and for their livelihood. The ID would retain virtually all of its current
powers, some in law and some unspoken. Only if the Project Committee
functioned effectively at the apex would farmers be able to impose some
responsibilities upon the technical staff. How this change could be imple-
mented was not spelled out, but it would probably be difficult to accom-
plish. There was a definite asymmetry in the conception behind this
formulation. Farmers are subject to the law and are seen as the "prob-
lem," while officials are instruments of the law, who impose a "solution."
(6) The mechanism for introducing and managing this system of
water-user associations was to be the Irrigation Department. The Project
Engineer is to demarcate boundaries for each JSPS and subsidiary field
channel units, to give notice for elections as suggested above, to set up
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initial meetings of the representatives, to oversee their elections, to
register each JSPS and keep a current register of members, certifying
that all are owner-cultivators or tenants. There is no hint that there are
any negative attitudes of farmers toward the ID or that this would affect
the elicitation of participation in the new organizations. Yet everything we
know about participation suggests that this would constitute a serious
obstacle.
There are real questions whether, even if it had farmer cooperation,
the ID could institute organizations down to the "grass roots," given its
shortages of staff. Vast responsibility is placed on the Project Engineer,
who in Gal Oya has tens of thousands of acres under his responsibility.
And even if he were able to get farmer participation in this "top-down"
manner, the result would be rather like "company unions." David Korten,
a consultant for the Ford Foundation in Manila, assisting the National
Irrigation Administration in the Philippines with its program to get irri-
gator associations established to work in cooperation with the NIA, com-
mented on the draft law for Sri Lanka:
.. . at every step of the organizing process the Project
Engineer or his representative would assume the initiative
and hold the authority. The members would have no say in
whether they wanted an association, how the organization
would be structured, what the powers and duties of the
association and its members would be, or even when the
organizing meetings and elections would be held.
All the signals during the formation process would com-
municate to participants that this is a government -domi-
nated organization established by government to serve
government interests and that the only role espected of
them was compliance. The officers who emerged out of
such a process would likely be those already reasonably
well connected and intent on exploiting every opportunity
to consolidate their local power base. Most water users
would be likely to perceive it as only one more attempt by
the government to control their lives and avoid involve-
mant to the extent possible.
o.. Would membership give me (if I were a farmer) any
greater assurance of getting water when I needed it?
Nothing in the draft suggests it would. Do I have any
interest in helping to enforce cropping schedules set at
District or Project levels? Definitely not. Since the ID
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has so little effective control, water conditions vary sub-
stantially throughout the scheme even on irrigated plots.
To get a decent crop under these conditions I have to
follow my own strategy based on my best estimate of what
my local conditions are likely to be. Standard cropping
schedules, even if set by farmers, do not serve my
interests.
Korten added that the act:
might even inhibit the formation of more effective volun-
tary associations of water users to respond to their self-
defined needs. I think here of the case in the Philippines
where the introduction of a legal requirement that all
farmers form pre-cooperatives actually inhibited the
operation and formation of voluntary cooperatives which
were effectively serving member interests. The govern-
ment-mandated co-ops by contrast simply absorbed re-
sources from the farmers while doing little for them. 36
Korten suggested that this unfortunate outcome might be duplicated in Sri
Lanka through passage of the proposed law. His observations point up the
problems inherent in such an approach of prescribing the formation of
organizations by law and delegating its implementation to a bureaucratic
agency, especially one at odds with the persons expected to become
members.
(7) A final problem arising with this approach is one of timing. One
of the purposes of asking ARTI and Cornell to work on farmer associations
in an experimental mode was to acquire experience on what kinds of WM
organization would work best, under what conditions, as well as how they
might be most effectively initiated. It would take at least two years to get
enough activity started on the ground and enough experience so that this
could be assessed fairly systematically. Yet the draft law, prepared by
the consultants in a matter of months, presented ARTI with a model to
implement rather than to test. The Ministry of Land and Land Develop-
ment agreed that the ARTI/Cornell activity would have flexibility to try
different models of organization, though ARTI could be seen as "testing"
the JSPS model. As it turned out, questions were increasingly raised about
the practicability of the draft law and the Ministry withheld action to get
the law enacted as drafted. The "inductive" approach was thus given a
chance to proceed more according to social science rather than some a
priori legal theory. As no formal organizations were being set up to
begin with, no legal requirements were raised. The Government Agent
could give some interim authority to the exercise if that were needed.
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IV. AN INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO WATER MANAGEMENT IN GAL OYA
The alternative which ARTI undertook with Cornell assistance
emphasized organization as an instrument for mobilization of resources,
regulation of behavior, generation of area-specific and problem-specific
information and enlisting more voluntarists' action. Organization--and
perhaps "non-state" law, rather than state law--was the instrument for
such purposes. Ultimately, organization may need some legal buttressing
from the state just as the conventional legal approach must work through
viable organizations. Law and organization must be complementary rather
than competitive if each is to succeed. But when one "walks on both legs,"
it makes a difference as to "which foot" one leads with. Legal arrange-
ments should support organizational processes rather than attempt to
create such processes by fiat. The alternative, inductive approach has the
following elements.
(1) It is more flexible. There is no assumption that some single
model will be optimal or should be prescribed, given the variety of local
circumstances. This does not mean utter diversity, which is anathema to
policy makers, lawyers and bureaucrats alike, but rather evolving frame-
works which both guide behavior toward widely -accepted goals and permit
some differences in the way problems are solved. A corollary of this is
that some significant degree of participation, or self-management, is
called for, to tailor group efforts to agreed-upon needs.
The initial request made to ARTI in the WMP paper was to design and
test a model of water-user organization for replication throughout the
project area and subsequently elsewhere in Sri Lanka. 3 7 As the team
assessed the situation in Gal Oya and the task before them generally, it
became clearer that no single model would likely be optimal within the
Left Bank (given its hydrological and ethnic diversity), let alone for all of
Gal Oya or all of Sri Lanka. So the team began to think in terms of devel-
oping models (plural), and then, even this seemed too narrow. Efforts
turned to formulating a process whereby, with some outside stimulus,
farmers would be encouraged to start forming organizations to manage
water. How similar or how diverse the ultimate organizational structures
would be remained to be determined from experience. By the end of two
years it was expected some fairly tenable conclusions would be drawn. An
undertaking as important and as novel as this should be prepared to reach
conclusions earlier if possible but to reserve judgment for longer if neces -
sary. Actually, within a year, what appeared to be fairly common patterns
of farmer initiated organization had emerged which could be supported by
law.
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(2) Because the interactions among farmers within an irrigation area
as well as between farmers and "outside" persons such as ID staff (or the
"change agents" discussed presently) are so important to efforts to get new
individual and collective WM behavior, these interactions need to be ex-
amined carefully. In introducing new organizational modes, one needs to
know how they are perceived and how those persons introducing them are
received -- to determine how the organizational modes and approach might
be modified to be more acceptable to farmers and thus more likely to "take
root." For this reason, the inductive strategy included a specific process
documentation component, with certain persons designated and supervised
to keep records of the organizational effort as it unfolds. This information
is fed back directly to the organizers so they know more about their re-
ception and progress. But it goes also to the program supervisors who
evaluate the work and how it might be improved. The program is not intro-
duced as if it were testing a hypothesis in a formal scientific way, running
the experiment through to the end before assessing it. Rather, each fea-
ture of the program represents a hypothesis of some kind, but modifica-
tions should be made as quickly as there is evidence that some other
manner of working promises better results. 3 8
(3) Rather than use official personnel to introduce the new organiza-
tional modes, a new cadre of institutional-organizers were recruited,
trained, posted in the field and supervised closely. (They are trained and
supervised to be facilitators and catalysts, not implementers of a work
plan "made in Colombo.") Even if individual government personnel have
positive attitudes toward farmers and good communication skills, there is
a legacy of imperious dealing between officials and farmers which is to be
avoided. The organizers, indeed, have no authority over farmers or other
low-level government staff; all must be done by persuasion and example.
Some programs in the Philippines which send out catalysts to work
with farmers and set up irrigation associations call their personnel "com-
munity organizers." They are trained as advocates to act on behalf of
farmers vis-.-vis the government departments. Initially they followed a
"confrontational" mode of organizing, after the philosophy of Sol Alinsky in
his strategy for anti-poverty efforts in the U.S., but when this approach
was not effective it gave way to a more "collaborative" mode. We con -
cluded that the latter posture would probably be more suitable in the situ-
ation of Gal Oya for improving water management activity. Because we
have made progress in a more "cooperative" mode, we have not experi-
mented with alternative modes.
The young men and women recruited as 1Os are university graduates
in arts or science or agriculture (Sri Lanka has a surplus of these
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graduates at present), and they were selected essentially on their quali-
fications including personal experience with irrig ated paddy farming in the
Dry Zone, and without political considerations. A Because most of 1Os
knew farming themselves, they were better able to satisfy farmers that
the program represented a serious effort to help them. (When one farmer
challenged an 10 saying this was just another program to give jobs to un-
employed graduates, the 10's assistance to another farmer by sowing seed
by hand answered that question.) When women 1Os might be asked how
they expected to help farmers with water management, they responded that
they were farmers' daughters themselves. 4 0 Certainly a good share of the
credit for what success the approach has demonstrated so far belongs to
the lOs, a very capable and highly motivated group. But the same can be
said of the farmers, as will be seen below, since their initial response
when approached in a solicitous, serious way has been most encouraging.
The organizers are presently working under ARTI, but the understanding
at the outset was that the ID would take them on as regular staff after two
years, assuming that they demonstrated WM progress. It will remain to
be seen how well their attitudes and performance are sustained in such a
transition.
(4) Rather than start with the distributary level as the focus of
organizational activity, this approach begins with the field channel, which
usually has 10 to 25 farmers cultivating along it. While head-and-tail-end
farmers may have conflicting interests over the water reaching the turn-
out structure which feeds their channel, they have a common interest vis-
a-vis the rest of the system. Often they will be related or may have had
informal labor exchange relationships over the years that provide a basis
for cooperation. Our assumption in this strategy was that one best begin
with a unit having some greater degree of social solidarity, which means
it must be relatively small and homogeneous. Our earlier work on local
organization in Asia, previously cited, established the case for having
such small units linked together into higher levels of organization. The
effectiveness of such higher levels depends in large part on the strength of
their base organizations, however. Thus, without detracting from the
importance of having D-channel organization, our efforts have focused
first on the field channel. Each 10 was assigned several such channels
during the initial, more intensive phase of organizing work. being respon-
sible for an area of about 120 acres with about 60 farmers.
(5) One hypothesis of the strategy being employed is that it is best to
begin with informal organization and to move toward more formal (legal)
organization at the farmers' own pace. This means that rather than set up
a formal organization first, and then undertake work through that organi-
zation, one encourages informal organization to begin carrying out useful
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work, and then introduces more formal associations when these are seen
as useful to the farmers for solving problems they cannot handle ade-
quately on an informal basis. 4 1 In a sense, this is the element of the
"inductive" strategy most at odds with the "deductive" approach. But it is
supported by the observation of the director of ARTI, Mr. T.B. Subesinghe,
that there is no problem in setting up organizations in Sri Lanka--a law
can be passed and government officials can get something started and
registered--but there is a problem in keeping them going--such paper
organizations accomplish little and disappear quickly.
(6) The project paper, as noted already, conceived of the physical
rehabilitation of the system as proceeding separately and parallel to the
effort to establish farmer organizations for water management. At the end
of the four-year life-of-project, farmers were expected to take over the
management of field channels, but also, if the legal framework proposed in
an annex to the project paper was enacted, at higher levels as well. This
seemed to make little sense in terms of behavioral theory because it was
so discontinuous. Rather, the organizational approach adopted undertook
to link the building of farmer organizations with farmer participation in the
rehabilitation program, to get away from the "turnkey" psychology.
To the extent that farmers would be involved in the redesign of 42
channels and would be investing their labor in some of the reconstruction,
they would regard the system more as "theirs." Also the actual new de-
sign should be a better one for having input of detailed local knowledge
concerning soil variations, drainage problems, etc., which it would be
costly and even difficult for technicians to know and specify. What was
interesting to observe was that the expectation that farmers would provide
labor to renovate the field channels created certain "power" in their hands.
Unless they were consulted on the new design and were satisfied with it,
they could refuse to do the desilting and bund reshaping work, or do it so
grudgingly and badly that the project was delayed and costs escalated.
Although there was no disposition initially for engineers to meet with
farmers on the specific redesigns for each channel, procedures for this
were devised and once engineers started meeting with farmers in groups of
15-20, they discovered that farmers had indeed some useful information to
contribute. Also, some of the engineers involved appreciated the improved
rapport which resulted from farmers getting more consideration.
The team's initial judgment has been that the organizational effort
should begin in the middle of the Left Bank system, where water problems
were thought more severe than at the head, but not so debilitating as at the
tail. Because the first year's construction program was scheduled for
4,000 acres at the head of the system, however, most of the initial 10
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postings were to this area. These 1Os had to move very quickly to
construct profiles on their field channel areas as well as set up meetings
between farmers and ID staff for the redesign effort. (One team of LOs
was posted to an area further downstream, scheduled for the second year's
construction program, in order to get some experience with farmer organ-
ization problems when impending rehabilitation was not affecting 1Os' and
farmers' behavior.)
There were some drawbacks to becoming so tied in with the
construction effort. It preoccupied the [0 program in the first-year con-
struction area and impinged on the plans to combine training and super-
vision over the first six months to build up more organizing skills and
confidence. Instead, 1Os were thrown into a situation where they have to
begin "delivering" right away. That they did so gave them more legiti-
macy in the eyes of the ID, and probably also with the farmers, though
that could be depreciated if experience with the reconstruction work turns
to be bad. The strategy did give a basis for engaging farmers in needed
activities, collecting information for the redesign, planning meetings with
ID staff, organizing work on the field channel, etc. These things could be
done informally, and in the process it was expected that new leadership
would emerge. Once certain farmers demonstrate commitment and com-
petence for helping other farmers solve their water problems, it should be
possible to get a new cadre of leaders coming forward from the farming
community, rather than have just the usual local leadership, politically
ambitious and socio -economically advantaged. There was already some
indication after a few months of this happening. 4 3
The principle, that work should proceed flexibly, building in options
as much as possible, has yet to be fully explored. To the extent that
similar patterns can be introduced or can be produced out of initially
diverse organizational activity we will move in that direction, as the
program seeks to accommodate rather than promote, diversity. Some
farmers from the outset have indicated feeling a need for some kind of
organization at the distributary level even though they agreed with begin-
ning in field channel groups (called "turnout groups" because they are
served by a common turnout). Tail-end farmers know they must coop-
erate with head-end ones to keep the top sections of distributaries cleaned
so that water will come more easily to the tail. Also groups along a D-
channel know that their bargaining power with the ID is enhanced when they
act together. In the set of field channels being organized outside the first-
year construction area, farmers requested formation of a D-channel level
organization federating their various turnout groups within several weeks
of forming these. Had such an organization been instituted mandatorily by
the ID, however, farmer readiness to participate would we think have been
much less.
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One form of flexibility in the organizational approach was to respond
to an impending crisis during the yala (dry) season of 1981, when the rains
that usually fell in the catchment 9-e'a failed and the reservoir of water fell
to only a fraction of its usual supply. This meant that only a much smaller
area could be planted and that even this was at risk of failure if no further
rains came. By the end of April, when the 1Os had been in the field for
only six weeks, it was evident that there was an immediate need for im-
proved water management to save as much of the crop as possible.
Accordingly, the lOs were asked to discuss the situation with farmers and
to encourage them to work out whatever arrangements for sharing and
saving water would be agreeable.
There were three elements of such an effort: (1) rotational distri-
bution of water within field channels so that all fields along it, including
the tail, got enough water; (2) voluntary labor (shramadana) to clean and
repair channels to make water run more quickly and efficiently along them;
and (3) reduced off-takes from the main system. Any combination of these
would be helpful, though shramadana might not be needed if the channel had
been kept in good condition (the minority of cases). Shramadana channel
cleaning would facilitate rotation and make it more feasible. Rotation
might reduce the amount of water needed to serve the area adequately, so
farmers by better WM could "donate" water to others downstream without
harming their own crop. When water at the head end was sufficient,
farmers could close off the D -channel sooner than they needed to and send
one, two or three days' worth of water to the tail.
These forms of WM improvement by improving efficiency of water use
should not jeopardize farmers' production, though there was some risk
that if water conditions worsened, some crops assisted by the sharing
would die anyway and the areas which had given up water earlier could be
less well off. Also, because the ID was not issuing water on a regular
schedule such as five-days-on, five-days-off (indeed, there was no evi-
dence that farmers were informed of a definite schedule by the ID), this
could put real stress on the paddy crop by extending the time it was without
water if such a rotation rather than continuous application were followed,
and might reduce yield.
We might expect that in such crisis circumstances, farmers'
willingness to cooperate and to exert themselves to save water for some-
one else's benefit would be minimal. But in fact, we observed surprising
cooperation. As seen below, farmer cooperation was not complete, but
considerably more than could probably have been achieved by other means.
A legalistic approach which ordered farmers to clean channels, rotate
delivery within channels, and reduce total off-take wouald have been unim-
plementable on such short notice. Farmer capacity to circumvent WM
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requirements they do not agree with has proved to be almost inexhaustible.
While farmer cooperation was not complete, it was considerably more than
could probably have been achieved by administrative-legal means.
The area covered by 10 efforts was 3,142 acres, and according to the
information they compiled it was cultivated by 1, 686 farmers along 71 field
channels or sub-field channels (grouped in 56 organizing areas). Only 10
percent accepted neither rotational deliveries nor water-saving schedules.
Thirty-seven percentinstituted some kind of rotational system (most with
some shramadana work done to facilitate water distribution); 26 percent
undertook both rotation and water-saving schedules to send water down-
stream; and 27 percent ageed among themselves to reduce their off-take
by one or two days (by 20 to 40 percent). 4 4 As an average for the whole
area, farmers agreed to what amounted to a 16 percent reduction in water
draws, though some of this had to be rescinded because of problems which
such water saving caused farmers (mostly encroachers) depending on
drainage water for their fields. We cannot know whether such an extent of
cooperation and WM effort would be achievable or sustainable when water
conditions are less dire, though the individual and collective need for this
would also be less then. What we see is that the approach outlined in this
section elicited some marked behavioral change under circumstances in
which one might have expected farmers to be more resistant to cooperative
efforts. The extent and expansion of farmer cooperation and initiative in
water management continuing in the following season (Maha 1981 -82) has
been even more encouraging than the first season's activity. 45
V. COMMON PROBLEMS
Discussion thus far has contrasted two approaches to securing
participation in water management and thereby equity and efficiency in
allocation of water resources. However, it is important to emphasize that
both approaches must still find ways of resolving some common problems.
(1) The social unit of organization. The bases for creating water
management groups is very important: criteria for inclusion and exclusion
determine whether the group is essentially made up of people accustomed
to cooperation with one another, how willing they are to make some sacri-
fices for other members, how much confidence they have in other members
and in the group.
The original units of settlement in Gal Oya were relatively homoge-
neous in terms of ethnicity and region of origin. They were not delimited
in hydrological terms, but simply according to administrative boundaries
that had little reality for water distribution, and so they included a number
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of distributaries with subsidiary field channels which often cut across the
lines of more than one colony. This meant that the normally difficult
relations between head and tail were compounded if farmers at the head
and tail had different administrative and sociological identies.
Administrative boundaries could be redrawn to correspond to
hydraulic units -- the command areas of separate channels -- but this would
not change, at least for some time, the sociological reality that people
were accustomed to living and working together in some different grouping.
An "inductive" approach can try by persuasion to establish new units of
cooperation. In the initial organizing effort, problems arose where
channels crossed unit boundaries; but in several instances, within one
season, new patterns of cooperation through farmer-representatives re-
placed previous patterns of conflict.
(2) Coordination of provision of water with provision of other agri-
cultural services. Farmers need draft power, seeds, fertilizer, credit,
etc., to take advantage of water's productive potential. The problem of
securing coordination of services is difficult: bureaucratic self-interests
invariably give precedence to suiting the agenda of one's administrative
superior rather than that of collateral administrative agencies--or
farmers. The draft amendment to the Irrigation Ordinance provided that
water-user associations may take on other agricultural functions besides
water management once they can effectively discharge this primary func-
tion. Cultivation Officers of the Agrarian Services Department, which
handles complementary inputs, would be ex-officio members of the JSPS
Executive Committee, a reasonable provision, and the Project Committee
would include the Assistant Commissioner for Agrarian Services as a
member. The alternative approach taken envisions the same broadening of
functions, but it did not spell out membership of higher-level associations
above the field channel level, though such an arrangement is quite com-
patible with its conception. In fact, officials from all relevant depart-
ments have now begun meeting regularly with farmer-representatives at
the sub-district level.
The solution to these needs for coordination (if there is one) seems to
rest not so much in legal injunctions as in the interpersonal influence
which farmers can exert when pressing claims for better service on ad -
ministrators--and politicians. This is a "demand-side" rather than a
"supply-side" theory of administrative performance. Client groups know
better, and more quickly, when there are lapses in agencies' work. The
organizational approach, building up from cohesive field -channel groups,
would seek means to put legitimate pressure on government officers to
provide both the amount and the proper coordination of services due to
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farmers. There is some evidence (from a system of farmer committees
introduced into the Minipe irrigation scheme not too far from Gal Oya)
that the performance of lower-level staff, not only in the ID but in Agrar-
ian Services and other departments, is improved once farmers are or-
ganized. 4 6
(3) Private lands and encroachments. The project was designed to
serve only land in the colonies. Yet 15,000-30,000 acres have been oper-
ated within the system, by using drainage water or tapping directly into
the irrigation system. The majority of these cultivators are smallholders
with only a few acres, but as noted above, some control 20, 50 or even
100 acres and rent it out. The power they add to the "tail -enders" was
something not considered in the legal approach, which, as drafted, would
give weighted representation to them. The lawyers, like the engineers,
tended to ignore drainage areas as they were not supposed to be cultivated;
but they are.
Unfortunately, there is no good solution to this problem in an
organizational approach. Should these cultivators be included in the water-
user association? Should the owners or tenants be represented? Should
they have their own associations? The initial efforts of the institutional-
organizers to get farmer cooperation to cope with water shortage in the
1981 yala season were in some instances thwarted by drainage-area
farmeirs. The conservation of water introduced by colonists cut the flow
of water in drainage canals by as much as 50 percent, but this led en-
croachers on drainage land to open the gates, break them or steal the
boards closing them off, to get more water sent through the D-channels.
So far, the large landowners with drainage land, having no legal status,
have tried to prevent their tenants from being involved in the meetings for
organizational purposes.
Experimentation must be attempted to find ways to handle this
problem. Simply enforcing legal prohibitions on ownership (or control) of
such land, especially control of landholdings in excess of the legal ceiling,
would be helpful, but it is most difficult. The ID in recent discussions has
indicated it would incorporate encroached areas within its jurisdiction into
its redesign and give them field turnouts with a maximum of two acres
each. It would then be up to the government to distribute these small
holdings as provided by law to eligible (landless) cultivators. We will see
if this works.
(4) Accommodating existing water management roles. This means
accepting any Vel Vidanes currently functioning in such roles as Field
Channel Representatives. Since few Vidanes function for such a small
area only, it is not clear that they could be "reduced" to this level of
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representation. But more serious is the fact that such "traditional" irri-
gation headmen generally are members of the local elite and have often
used their position in the past to aggrandize themselves. Farmers may
defer to them because of their power but not necessarily because of
intrinsic respect. To co-opt them into operating a "modern" system of
WM raises questions of equity as well as of voluntary participation by
farmers.
Unfortunately, the inductive approach has no certain answer to this.
If farmers are to elect their own representatives, they may elect such
persons out of fear or to be sure of getting favors. On one of the channels
where 1Os initially attempted to introduce rotational distribution of water,
we found that the person elected as Farmer -Representative under the
Agrarian Services Act to handle agricultural inputs was the former Vel
Vidane, and politically influential. He opposed the 10's suggestions, not
revealing why. It turned out that although his land was at the tail-end of
the field channel, he had gotten an ID official to raise the pipe inlets to the
plots of those farmers above him, so his field even though situated at the
tail got water before the rest. Any farmer organization was a threat to
his privilege. The other farmers resented this action; but they had never
before had any outside person villing to be supportive; so they agreed to
both rotation and shramadana, but this former Vel Vidane got the rotation
stopped by bringing complaints. 4 7
This episode finally had a happy outcome. After learning of this
conflict in June 1981, 1 was concerned to know what had happened when I
visited the area in January 1982. This particular person had in the mean-
time been fully "converted" to the farmer organization approach, including
its egalitarian and participatory features, and had been elected as a repre-
sentative himself. When visiting a neighboring scheme (Muthukandia) with
three other farmer-representatives in January to talk about farmer organi-
zations for water management, he was outspoken and articulate in favor of
this approach. Similarly, the other local elite figure who had been oppos-
ing farmer organization last June had come around fully by January to be
one of the program's biggest boosters. We attribute these changes of
heart to the fact that 1Os started by communicating directly and individu-
ally with farmers to explain the purposes of organization and to elicit
encouragement for new, more cooperative and equitable arrangements con-
cerning water. This appears to create an environment in which more priv -
ileged farmers have to go along or be passed by. We do not know how
widespread such a dynamic can be, however, or how successful the organ-
izational approach can be in other settings. Resistance by local elites
must be anticipated and dealt with by any WM approach.
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(5) The orientation of engineers toward working with farmers.
Initially the attitudes of engineers toward farmers was not very respectful,
and the farmers reacted to this treatment. Much of the "irrational" or
"anti-social" behavior of farmers--breaking gates, putting in unauthorized
pipes from channels to their fields, cultivating "reserved" areas along
channels that are moist with seepage water, etc. -- is a response, justified
in their eyes, to the unrealistic rules or bureaucratic rigidities of the ID.
Our work in Gal Oya has made clearer than before the extent to which
farmer behavior in WM is a reflection of the practice, good or bad, of the
technical department concerned.
The draft law, as noted, listed many responsibilities for farmers and
none for engineers. Any approach, however, must have the support of the
latter, since water management, as described at the outset of this paper,
requires cooperation between engineers and farmers. The latter can
handle on-farm water management pretty much on their own, but the
middle range of WM activities -- water distribution among and along distrib-
utary and field channels -- involves great interdependence.
An axion formulated early in our fieldwork is that farmers will not
change their behavior unless and until the engineers change theirs. Here
is where the biggest problem for improving water management comes in.
Lapses in ID performance are common rather than the exception. The
deductive approach, especially as framed in this instance, did not address
them. The 1Os (with the involvement of ARTI supervisors and Cornell
consultants) have been trying to foster better understanding between
farmers and engineers, particularly to show the degree of responsible WM
performance that farmers are capable of if approached constructively.
This has been helped by sensible suggestions from some farmers in their
meetings with engineers about redesign of channels, including some solu-
tions that are technically sound which had not been considered by the ID
staff.
One of the most gratifying results of the approach so far has been the
extent to which such cooperative relations have arisen, quickly and with
apparent good will on both sides. The engineers' and technical assistants'
responsiveness to farmer -representatives has been an encouragement in
turn for farmers to discharge water management responsibilities at the
field channel and even D-channel level more effectively. What we have
been seeing justifies some modification of our earlier formulation in that
farmer initiatives in response to the 10 efforts have helped to change the
attitudes and performance of technical staff, which changes in turn are an
incentive for better farmer attitudes and performance. The point of par-
ticular relevance here is that legal enactments implemented by government
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staff operating in their previous manner would be unlikely to achieve this
reorientation on both sides.
VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL APPROACHES
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has not been to discredit the
use of legal instruments for improving water management but rather to
emphasize the need to examine assumptions and limitations of proposed
enactments, with a view to fitting them to an effective integrated strategy
for water management. "Bottom-up" efforts need some legal sanction and
support. Here some elements that could strengthen a legal approach are
suggested.
(1) The need for some experimentation in advance of drafting and
enactment of legislation seems obvious in something as complicated as
water management. While some legal authorization may be needed for
experiments, this can be done on an ad hoc basis. In Sri Lanka, it can be
done presently on the authority given to Government Agents in each district
for implementation of development programs. An approach which works
deductively, from some body of a priori legal principles, seems particu-
larly inadvisable.
(2) The need to work from an ample knowledge base, rather than
some imported model (as appears to have been the case here) is also ob-
vious. There must be an understanding, for example, of the extent and
role of private lands and of the real role of Vel Vidanes if they are to be
incorporated fruitfully into the legal scheme. The innovative suggestion of
weighted voting to favor the tail -enders turns out in Gal Oya to be mistaken
in many potential JSPS areas because of the anomaly of powerful tail-
enders.
The sociological research needed is not necessarily detailed or
expensive. Cornell consultants learned a great deal about these problems
after only several weeks in the field with their Sri Lankan colleagues, at
least enough to know of their existence and the need to adapt legal provi-
sions accordingly. We would caution, however, that seasonality plays a
particularly important role in any agricultural activities and getting some
knowledge of how the system will require at least a year's observation.
The law, indeed, should probably make some bows to the difference be-
tween "wet" and "dry" seasons, for example, as the relevance of farmer
organizations and various WM practices can differ dramatically between
the two. W
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(3) The agency which introduces new activities and structures is
more important for success than the technical construction of the law
establishing them. This is especially relevant when it comes to develop-
ment, which often involves getting quite different behavior, rather than
regulating existing behavior. The agents of change in effect embody the
law in the eyes of those subject to it. Entrusting the task of communica-
tion and persuasion to bureaucrats or technocrats with a legacy of often
adverse relations with the public is likely to be much less successful than
having specially trained, supervised and motivated "catalysts" presenting
the new ideas and expectations. A legal approach can provide for such
latter roles, but it is not disposed to do so unless made especially aware
of this possibility.
(4) The need to provide for use of more than one model is important
-- so that variations can be made to suit local circumstances. The elemen-
tary principle of justice is not to treat all cases alike, but to treat all like
cases alike. There are definite diseconomies of differentiation when iF
comes to administering a program and these must be weighed. Variation
should not be maximized but rather provided for. The draft law in this
case did provide some options, quite commendably, to have a representa-
tive instead of a committee at field channel level, or to use existing WM
roles. But beyond this, the legal framework was conceived, in its deduc-
tive way, as quite uniform.
(5) Perhaps it is the homogeneity of water as a resource, and the
ubiquity of farmers' need for water that implies a feasibility for standard -
ization in water management practices. The rules governing its manage-
ment should switch depending on water circumstances, whether in scarcity
or abundance. Observation of how farmers themselves manage water
suggests this need. There is no point in having strict rules and ambitious
enforcement of allocation schemes when water is abundant, and perhaps
special rules of strict rationing, rather than optimizing distribution, may
be appropriate with severe shortage. 4 9 Management activities entail
costs to farmers as well as to the relevant officials, and there is a trade-
off to be considered always as to whether increments in management effort
"pay" -- and to whom? We observe that farmers have various "fall -back"
strategies as a rule, letting management lapse when water is more abun-
dant than usual and progressively instituting stricter controls as relative
scarcity increases. As usually conceived now. legal rules do not allow
for such variations in water availability. But with some imagination, and
some testing, more flexibility could be written into the laws, particularly
to differentiate between "wet" and "dry" seasons.
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(6) Building in incentives for compliance should be part of the task of
formulating legal solutions to social problems. From a farmer's perspec-
tive the draft law entailed many more onerous "duties" than attractive
"powers." The drafter had not put himself in a farmer's position and
asked (as Korten did), "what is in this for me?" The presumption that be-
havior required by law will be forthcoming is patently unrealistic in LDCs,
even one as administratively integrated and "penetrated" as Sri Lanka.
The most effective impulses on behavior come from social pressures aris -
ing from one's membership in a group (a formal group or an informal one,
or only a reference group from which one derives status and satisfaction).
The organizational approach seeks to build group consensus so that mem-
bers are indeed satisfied that the expected behavior is acceptable. A legal
approach would do well to look for such avenues to get more voluntaristic
compliance.
(7) The attitudes and behavior of government staff are critical to the
attitudes and behavior of persons subject to the law. There is a tendency
to "blame the victim" for failures of government programs, when in fact
the program and its presentation should be scrutinized before externalizing
fault-finding. This has been one of the most dramatic conclusions from
our involvment in the Gal Oya project. Like lawyers, students of public
administration tend to regard bureaucracy as fairly impersonal and rela-
tively neutral. In fact, the characteristics of the bureaucracy are anything
but neutral as far as many parts of the public are concerned. Thus when
seeking legal solutions to development problems, one should be sure that
the "channel" for solving the problem is not a problem in itself. 50
(8) Legal reforms need political support, not only for passage but for
implementation. Especially if the kind of flexible, experimental approach
suggested here is followed, there is need for political authorization, for
funding of special staff to supervise and monitor new activities, for pro-
moting cooperation from other agencies, etc. Legal initiatives in develop-
ment need not only to be "sold" to politicians but their active understanding
and interest need to be solicited so that innovations will not get left "twist-
ing slowly in the wind." This, of course, applies as fully to an organiza-
tional approach, which may run afoul of vested interests more quickly than
a legal approach.
This reminds us that developmental change, whether because it is
instigated by political institutions or has ramifications for them, is not
sustainable without a strong measure of political support from some
quarter or quarters. A difference between the two approaches is that the
organizational approach once started is more likely to generate some
political support on behalf of the new system. It is more likely to create a
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constituency that makes continuing developmental change politically
feasible, even if opposed by some. This set of issues, of course, gets us
well beyond questions of "law in development. " But it needs to be men-
tioned in conclusion because a-political efforts at legal reform for develop-
ment will probably be more vulnerable, the more significant are the needed
changes they attempt.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Council on Environmental Quality and Department of State, The
Global 2000 Report to the President, Volume 1I, Chapter 9 (Wash-ington:
Government Printing Office, 1980). With regard to Sri Lanka, this has
been argued by Robert Chambers, Water Management and Paddy Pro-
duction in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka (Colombo: Agrarian Research and
Training Institute, 1975).
2. The World Food Conference in 1974 estimated that $85 billion was
needed worldwide to build new and rehabilitative existing irrigation
systems to meet increasing food demands; in 1981 dollars, the esti-
mated expenditure would be $150 billion, and even more if sustained
development is sought rather than just feeding the population. A study
by the International Food Policy Research Institute based in Washington
has indicated a need for $100 billion by 1990 to meet food needs--half of
this ($52 billion) in water resource development.
3. Robert Wade and Robert Chambers, "Managing the Main System: Canal
Irrigation's Blind Spot," Economic and Political Weekly, XV:39, Septem-
ber, 1980.
4. In Sri Lanka, to economize on water use, a cultivation calendar is set
before each season, prescribing dates for ploughing, first water issue,
etc. Once it is promulgated by the Government Agent, it has legal
standing. But its enforcement is almost impossible because farmers
have so many excuses for delay that the valid and invalid ones cannot be
readily sorted out. One main reason for non-compliance is the unpre-
dictable management of the main system, which gives farmers reason
to follow a very conservative coltivation strategy, not trusting the set
schedule.
5. The value and importance of a legal framework for improving water
management is cited along with other factors by Anthony Bottrall,
"Improving Canal Management: The Role of Evaluation and Action
Research," Water Supply and Management, 5, 1981, p. 72. This
analysis is based on a research project he carried out for the World
Bank.
6. There is a growing and theoretically substantial literature in political
science and economics on "public goods" and "collective behavior,"
thus far best represented by Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective
Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press-1965).
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Economic theory has regarded equitable distribution of resources and
their efficient use as opposed to one another. Unequal distribution, it
was thought, led to accelerated capital formation and greater incre-
ments to output, and to more incentive to progress. Both the incentive
effects and the linkage between capital and output, as well as inequal-
ity's impact on saving and investment, are now questioned. See
William R. Cline, "Distribution and Development: A Survey of Litera-
ture," Journal of Development Economics, February, 1975, pp. 359-
400; and Joel Bergsman, Growth and Equity in Semi-Industrialized
Countries, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 351, Washington:
World Bank, August, 1979.
John W. Mellor et al., Developing Rural India: Plan and Practice
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 112. This is discussed
further by Robert Chambers in "In Search of a Water Revolution:
Questions for Managing Canal Irrigation in the 1980s," Report of a
Planning Workshop on Irrigation Water Management (Los Banos:
International Rice Research Institute, 1980), pp. 25-28.
See Chambers, Water Management and Paddy Production in the Dry
Zone of Sri Lanka, op. cit. Of course farmers may be trying in-
dividually to maximize returns to their labor, land or capital.
For the Gal Oya scheme, discussed below, one of the Cornell con-
sultants, Professor Randolph Barker, Department of Agricultural
Economics, has estimated, based on Philippine research, that as
much as 50 percent of the potential yield increase from better
management could be achieved from improvements in the main
systems, with only minor physical repairs and without costly major
rehabilitation. The resulting yield increases would be attained at
relatively low cost.
This was one of the main conclusions of an international seminar
organized by the Agricultural Development Council and held in
Colombo in August 1980. See seminar report by Gilbert Levine and
Henry C. Hart, Mobilizing Local Resources for Irrigation (New York:
Agricultural Development Council, 1981). For analyses of experience
in Philippines and Thailand which demonstrate this point, see T. H.
Wickham and A. Valera, "Practices and Accountability for Better
Water Management," and S. Duncan, "Local Irrigators' Groups:
Assessment of Their Operations and Maintenance Functions," in
International Rice Research Institute, Irrigation Policy and Manage-
ment in Southeast Asia (Los Banos: IRRI, 1978), esp. pp. 74 and 191.
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12. The history of the ID is presented in a 75th anniversary jubilee
volume, Diyawara--Irrigation (Colombo: Irrigation Department, 1975).
The colonization schemes are chronicled and analyzed in B. H. Farmer,
Peasant Colonization Schemes: Land Settlement in the Dry Zone of
Ceylon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). Interesting
insight is gained from the reminiscences in Diaywara of a former
Deputy Director who entered the ID in the 1930s. A village headman
who failed to address a Technical Assistant with enough deference was
told indignantly, "Ask permission (to address me), man!" and the man
fell prostrate on the floor. At that time, a Technical Assistant would
be addressed by peasants as "Your reverence," and his supervising
engineer was called "Great reverence." The Director of Irrigation was
referred to as "God-like Reverence." "Such were things when I joined
the Irrigation Department," the former DD wrote.
13. As the ID's director recently observed, many disciplines and depart-
ments are involved in some way in water management, but when
problems arise it is most often the engineer who gets blamed (remarks
at Inginiyagala, January 16, 1982).
14. Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1954). For a Sri Lankan critique citing the Ceylonese case, see R.A.
L.H. Gunawardana, "Irrigation and Hydraulic Society in Early Medi-
eval Ceylon," Past and Present, November 1971; see also E.R. Leach,
"Hydraulic Society in Ceylon," Past and Present, April 1979.
15. K.M. de Silva writes: "The administrative infrastructure, especially
at the village and district level, appears to have been strong and re-
silient enough to cope with periods of turmoil during power struggles
in the upper reaches of the administrative structure at the capital, or
during foreign invasions. These were, in a sense, more enduring than
the central government institutions.... No doubt the maintenance of this
system in good repair, quite apart from its expansion, required a so-
phisticated machinery of administration under central control. But it
was the permanent institutions rooted among the people at the village
level which ensured the survival of the system luring the periods of
turmoil which were a regular feature of Sri Lanka's ancient history."
Sri Lanka: A Survey (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977),
K.M. de Silva, editor, p. 36.
16. This pillar now stands in the district headquarters at Ampare, where
the Gal Oya project administration is centered.
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17. The Collapse of the Rajarata Civilisation in Ceylon and the Drift to
the Southwest, edited by K. Indrapala, Ceylon Studies Seminar Series
(Peradeniya: University of Ceylon, 1971).
18. Michael Roberts, "The Paddy Lands Irrigation Ordinances and the
Revival of Traditional Irrigation Customs, 1856-1871," in E. Walter
Coward, Jr., editor, Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia:
Perspectives from the Social Sciences (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1980), pp. 186-202.
19. This role is best described in E.R. Leach, Pul Eliya, a Village in
Ceylon: A Study of Land Tenure and Kinship (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1961). Its lesser importance in a Wet Zone village
is described in Marguerite S. Robinson, Political Structure in a
Changing Sinhalese Village (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1975).
20. During the Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa civilization, the Dry Zone
supported most of the country's population, perhaps as many people as
now inhabit Sri Lanka. This was made possible by the network of
major and minor tanks covering the area. With the collapse of the
civilization and tanks (see source cited in footnote 17), the population
withdrew to the Wet Zone, which now supports two-thirds of the
country's people on just one-quarter of its area. The colonization
policy was meant to reduce this concentration of population while in-
creasing food production and employment opportunities. See Farmer,
Peasant Colonization Schemes, op. cit.
21. Sinhala-speaking Sri Lankans form the majority of the country, about
70 percent and are predominantly Buddhist; the Tamil -speaking mi-
nority is mostly Hindu and had considered at least the coastal region
of the Gal Oya area as a Tamil area for some time. Moslems,
mostly Tamil-speaking, form another minority and are more nu-
merous in the project area than elsewhere in Sri Lanka.
22. Report of the Gal Oya Project Evaluation Committee, Sessional Papers
1-70 (Colombo: Government Printing Department, January, 1970).
This Commission was chaired by Professor B.H. Farmer from Cam-
bridge University, probably the most knowledgeable person on Sri
Lankan settlement schemes.
23. A study of this second-generation settler problem has been done by
Shyamala Abeyratne, A Study of Second Generation Settlers in the
Gal Oya Project, Sri Lanka, M.TS. thesis, Department of Rural
Sociology, Cornell University, 1982.
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24. It is also said that village headmen in the Wet Zone, instructed to
recruit households to be settled in Gal Oya, which already had a bad
reputation as an undesirable area, chose this opportunity to get rid of
"trouble makers" or "misfits" in their villages. To the extent this
was true, the initial population would be less disposed toward cooper-
ation than even their mixed places of origin would provide.
25. This is reported in the consultants' report on which the Gal Oya
project design was based: CH2M Hill, Proposed Water Management
Program for Major Irrigation Schemes in Sri Lanka, February 1979.
26. It was reported to us during a field trip in Gal Oya during June, 1981,
that some staff of the ID removed working gates from the Left Bank
and installed them on the Right Bank, where they had private land of
their own, with the expectation that the AID-funded project would
repair or replace all gates on the Left Bank anyway.
27. This same kind of situation is reported for the Philippines and Indo-
nesia by Frances F. Korten in a paper presented to the World Bank
Sociological Workshop in July 1981: "Building National Capacity to
Develop Water Users' Association: Experience from the Philippines,"
pp. 30-31.
28. The design team did include a sociologist, with more experience in
Sri Lanka than the technical team members had. But his inputs to the
report were relegated to a minor position and were hardly integrated
with the rest of the analysis and prescription. That he was British as
well as a sociologist made him doubly marginal in a team of American
technicians.
29. The Cornell Water Management group included faculty in agricultural
engineering, agricultural economics, anthropology, rural sociology
and political science, as well as graduate students from these and
other disciplines. The Rural Development Committee's chairmen to
date have both been involved in the Sri Lanka work.
30. See David C. Korten, "Community Organization and Rural Develop-
ment: A Learning Process Approach," Public Administration Review,
September-October, 1980.
31. The comparative analysis of water management legislation and
organizational experience in various countries which formed a basis
for this legal advice is presented in a paper prepared for USAID/TAB/
RD by George E. Radosevich, Improving Agricultural Water Use:
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Organizational Alternatives (Fort Collins, Colo.: Resources Admin-
istration and Development, 1977). See also Radosevich, Water User
Organizations for Improving Irrigated Agriculture: Applicability to
Pakistan (Fort Collins: Water Management Research Project, Colo-
rado State University, 1975).
32. Annex 12 to the WMP paper, cited in footnote 24 above, was written
by Radosevich and entitled "Organizing Farmers for Water Manage-
ment in Sri Lanka." It discussed water users' associations in Spain
and the Philippines and proposed the JSPS framework in very specific
terms.
33. In a study of Asian countries' experience with rural development, such
multi-tiered organization was found associated with the more success-
ful cases. See Uphoff and Esman, Local Organization for Rural Devel-
opment: Analysis of Asian Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University,
Rural Development Committee, 1974).
34. This concept, which emphasizes some opposite effects of economies
of scale and some advantages of small-scale enterprises, is discussed
in Clement Onyemelukwe, Economic Development: An Inside View
(London: Longmans, 1974).
35. This is the figure which the ARTI Institutional-Organizers were able
to determine. One unofficial estimate puts the maximum figure at
nearly 1,000 acres.
36. Draft Irrigation Act and the Organization of Water User Associations,
Memorandum to Ministry of Lands and Land Development, from David
Korten, ARTI/Cornell Consultant, September 10, 1980, pp. 1, 3 and 4.
37. The project paper's formulation was mostly a "legal," top-down one as
it stated a target of having 19,000 farmers "organized" by the end of
the fourth year of the project, following the passage of a law for water-
user associations. ARTI was to have designed and tested a "best"
model. The two efforts should probably have been tackled sequentially
rather than simultaneously.
38. This element of development strategy is discussed in Korten, "Commu-
nity Organization and Rural Development," op. cit. The "process docu-
mentation" strategy was evolved in support of the work with irrigation
associations by the Philippines' National Irrigation Administration.
More detail is given in Frances Korten's paper cited in footnote 27.
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39. Getting this latter provision delayed the program by several months,
but it was critical for the success of the los that all have the neces-
sary qualifications and not be able to slack off because of political
sponsorship protecting their job regardless of performance.
40. One of the "hypotheses" tested in the first batch of 10 recruits was
whether women could perform adequately in this role. Two programs
similar to this in the Philippines found that their women organizers
were on the average probably better than the men. There was doubt
this would be true in Sri Lanka, however, with its South Asian rather
than Southeast Asian attitudes toward women's roles. Almost one-
third of the recruits were women and after three months in the field,
all supervisors agreed the women were on the average at least as
effective as the men. They were screened more carefully to begin
with, and are perhaps more concerned about proving themselves
effective. Farmers appeared more willing to respond to requests
and suggestions from the women.
41. Actually, in the area where lOs are active in advance of the rehabili-
tation program, farmers set up explicit water management groups
fairly quickly, with elected representatives, but these are not legally
registered yet. How they will be formalized and federated will be
explored with them and government officials as part of the experiment.
42. The latter was called for in the project paper, but it seemed prompted
mostly as a way to get free labor and contain project costs, as well as
to have some evidence of farmer "participation" in the project.
43. 1Os were told specifically not to put themselves, or let themselves get
put, into a situation where they became spokesmen and community
leaders. After three montfhs, we queried lOs on whether irrigation-
oriented leadership had emerged, and already in this time period, on
three-fourths of the channels some evidence of farmer leadership
could be pointed to, though not all was new. Uphoff, "Initial Report
on Water Management Activities of Institutional -Organizers for Water
Management Project, Gal Oya, Sri Lanka, May-July, 1981" (Colombo:
ARTI and Ithaca: RDC, September, 1981) mimeo, pp. 13-14.
44. Data are from the report cited in previous footnote. los were asked
to provide data on a channel-by-channel basis, and these were ana-
lyzed and summarized in the report.
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45. Information on this is reported in the author's trip report, "The Insti-
tutional -Organizer (10) Programme in the Field After Ten Months: A
Report on Trip to Ampare/Gal Oya, Sri Lanka, January 14-17, 1982"
(Colombo: ARTI and Ithaca: RDC, February, 1982), mimeo.
46. The ID's Deputy Director for the range administering Minipe has been
unusually innovative in promoting such a system on his own initiative
and authority. It is reported by the Deputy Director, N. G. R. de Silva,
in "Farmer Participation in Water Management: The Minipe Project in
Sri Lanka," Rural Development Participation Review, I 11:1, Fall 1981.
47. In this case, the person spreads rumors against the 10 involved, first
alleging that he used and sold marijuana, and then claiming that the 10
program was a plot to raise production for farmers, and get them on
the 1O's side, and then to make a revolution in Gal Oya. Friendly
farmers brought these rumors straight to the 10.
48. An empirical study of water-user groups in two large-scale irrigation
schemes in the Philippines, testing for causes and consequences of
effective group performance, found substantially different statistical
relationships between the "wet" and "dry" seasons. See unpublished
Ph.D. thesis by David M. Robinson, "Determinants and Results of
Performance of Water Users' Organizations in Two Large Philippine
Irrigation Systems," Department of Government, Cornell University,
1982.
Similar differences in water management behavior, under very differ-
ent ecological circumstances, were found by an interdisciplinary re-
search team from the Cornell Rural Development Committee studying
management of small catchment dams in Botswana by state-sponsored
"dam groups." During the first nine months of field work, the team
could not ascertain why the farmer groups were so "ineffective." They
didn't have meetings or collect fees to maintain the dams as they were
legally supposed to do. But, when other sources of water had dried up
and the dams became critical to farmers' and their herds' survival,
the groups came to life (like the grass on an arid plain after the rains
come again). They carried out necessary functions quite effectively.
But all this was missed during other parts of the year. See Louise
Fortmann and Emery Roe, Water Points Survey (Gabarone: Ministry
of Agriculture, 1981). Year-round rules of water management, irre-
spective of water conditions, made no sense to the farmers, and were
not "efficient."
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49. These alternatives are examined in an article by the author with
M.L. Wickramasinghe and C.M. Wijayaratne, "'Optimal Participa-
tion' in Water Management: Issues and Evidence from Sri Lanka,"
which lays out the theoretical considerations for when farmer
participation in water management is most productive, and finds
empirical support for the analysis from detailed data collected by
ARTI investigators in the Gal Oya area.
50. This issue is dealt with at more length in David C. Korten and
Norman Uphoff, "Bureaucratic Reorientation for Participatory Rural
Development," NASPAA Working Papers (Washington: National Asso-
ciation of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, 1981).
